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Empirical evidence shows that a significant proportion of analysts 
issue their forecasts at the time of an earnings announcement (Ivković 
and Jegadeesh 2004). These forecasts are commonly regarded as analyst 
interpretations of earnings news contained in the announcement (Schipper 
1991). Although analytical studies suggest that market reaction to news 
from earnings announcement could be affected by analysts’ interpretation 
information (Kim and Verrecchia 1994, 1997), the vast majority of previous 
research has ignored whether and how these analysts’ interpreting forecasts 
affect the market reaction to the earnings announcements. Our empirical 
results show that sensitivity of trading volume reaction to earnings 
announcements is increasing in the number of announcement period 
analyst forecasts. The sensitivity of trading volume reaction is greater 
when there is small analyst forecast dispersion. We also find that stock 
return sensitivity is also increasing with the number of analyst forecasts. In 
general, our results suggests that analysts’ interpretation help disseminate 
new information contained in earnings announcement to the market. 
Keywords: earnings announcement, analyst forecast, forecast timing, stock price 
reaction, trading volume
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1. inTRoDuCTion
Financial statements and analyst forecasts are two primary 
information sources available to market participants for assessing 
firm value. A large number of studies have examined the 
information content of either earnings announcements or analyst 
forecasts separately (see Brown [1993] and Lev [1989] for a review). 
However, empirical evidence shows that a significant proportion 
of analysts issue their forecasts at the time of an earnings 
announcement (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004). These forecasts are 
commonly regarded as analyst interpretations of earnings news 
contained in the announcement (Schipper 1991). Surprisingly, the 
vast majority of previous research has ignored whether and how 
these analysts’ interpreting forecasts affect the market reaction to 
the earnings announcements. The purpose of this study is to fill this 
gap by empirically investigating how market reactions to earnings 
announcements are affected by analysts’ forecasts at the time of 
earnings announcements. 
Prior research documents that analysts produce and disseminate 
new information to market. For example, firms with high analyst 
coverage tend to experience smaller hedge portfolio returns 
(Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan 1993; Hong, Lim, and 
Stein 2000) and smaller magnitude of post-earnings announcement 
return drift (Bartov 1992; Zhang 2008). These studies use analysts 
as a proxy for informed traders, assuming that the amount of 
information generated by informed traders is positively correlated 
with the number of analyst following a firm. More rapid stock 
price adjustment to new information for firms with higher analyst 
coverage suggests that analysts play the role of new information 
provider in the market. However, public firm disclosures, such 
as earnings announcements, are also important sources of new 
information to the market and analysts’ another important role 
is to interpret news from firm disclosures (Schipper 1991). Prior 
studies studies do not consider the analysts’ interpreting role at 
such informational events. In this study, we focus on analysts’ 
interpreting role by limiting our interest to informational event of 
earnings announcements and analysts’ forecasting activities at the 
earnings announcements.
Several studies examine the effect of earnings announcements on 
disagreements among investors (e.g., Barron et al. 1998; Kandel and 
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Pearson 1995) and the association between disagreement among 
investors and trading volume (e.g., Bamber, Barron, and Stober 
1997; Barron 1995; Barron, Harris, and Stanford 2005). These 
studies use individual analysts’ forecast revisions made within 
relatively long periods around an earnings announcement (usually 
45 days prior to and 30 days following the earnings announcement) 
as proxy for individual investor’s belief revision. However, a 
significant portion of analysts issues forecasts almost at the same 
time with earnings announcements (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; 
Stickel 1989). Analytical studies suggest potential effect of analyst 
forecasts on market reaction to earnings announcement (Kim and 
Verrecchia 1994, 1997), but this issue has not been examined. 
We first examine how analysts’ forecasts affect trading volume 
reaction to earnings announcements. Analytical theories suggest 
that earnings announcements covey news regarding firm value 
and trigger temporary information asymmetry among investors 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Verrecchia 2001). Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994, 1997) suggest that some market participants who observe 
information from informed traders, like security analysts, use the 
information in conjunction with earnings announcements in a 
way to reduce errors contained in earnings news. This interpreting 
information stimulates investors’ information judgments about 
earnings news, resulting in more trading based on earnings 
news. If the number of analyst forecasts at the time of earnings 
announcement reflects the amount of interpreting information 
regarding earnings news and the speed of information dissemination 
to market (Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan 1993; Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam 1995), we expect a positive relation between 
trading volume reaction to earnings news and the number of analyst 
announcement period forecasts. We also examine how sensitivity 
of volume reactions is affected by the uncertainty in analysts’ 
interpreting information.
We then examine whether the pricing impact of the earnings 
announcement varies with the number of analyst forecasts made 
during the announcement event window. Theory suggests that more 
trading make stock price more informative as stock price aggregates 
individuals’ information (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Kim and 
Verrecchia 1994; Kyle 1985). If analysts help investors understand 
earnings signals regarding future earnings and make them trade 
based on earnings news, we expect that stock price reactions to 
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earnings news will be positively related with analysts’ forecasting 
activities. 
We conduct our empirical analysis on a sample of 115,761 firm-
quarter observations with available data between 1996 and 2010. 
We measure the extent of analysts’ interpreting activities by the 
number of analyst forecasts issued within two trading days after an 
earnings announcement (i.e., trading days 0 and 1 with respect to 
the announcement date). We study abnormal stock turnover ratios 
adjusted by firm-specific non-announcement period turnover ratios 
or three-digit SIC industry mean turnover ratios.  
Our empirical results show that the trading volume reaction to 
stock price change increases monotonically with the number of 
analyst forecasts issued at the time of earnings announcement  We 
regress abnormal trading volume on absolute stock return, the 
number of analyst forecasts, and the interaction between number 
of analyst forecasts and absolute stock return. We find that the 
magnitude of coefficients on stock price change is increasing with 
the number of analyst forecasts. Note that these results are obtained 
after controlling for other factors such as firm size, market-to-book 
ratio, analyst coverage, prior stock return volatility, and other firm 
disclosure characteristics. Especially, we control for analyst coverage 
as analyst forecasting activities are positively correlated with analyst 
coverage.
We also find less sensitive volume reactions to stock price changes 
for firms with large dispersion. We measure uncertainty of analysts’ 
interpretations as forecast dispersion at the time of earnings 
announcement. Consistent with prior studies (Bamber, Barron, and 
Stober 1997, 1999; Barron 1995), we find higher level of trading 
volume for firm with higher dispersion in multivariate test. However, 
the sensitivity of trading volume to stock price change is smaller for 
firms with large dispersion. These results suggest uncertainty in 
analysts’ interpretation weaken the informational effect of earnings 
announcement. Similar results are obtained when we use consensus 
measure developed Barron et al.’s (1998) as proxy for uncertainty in 
analyst forecasts.
Finally, we examine the implications of concurrent analyst 
forecasts for stock price reactions by regressing cumulative 
abnormal returns on unexpected earnings, the number of analyst 
forecasts, and the interaction between number of analyst forecasts 
and unexpected earnings. The evidence indicates that stock price 
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sensitivity is increasing in the number of announcement period 
forecasts. These results suggest that more active tradings related 
to earnings announcements make stock price reflect earnings news 
more quickly (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Kyle 1985). These results 
are consistent with findings by Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) and 
Zhang (2006) that stocks prices adjust to earnings news more slowly 
when there is larger forecast dispersion. 
Since greater stock price and trading volume reactions to earnings 
news could arise from unidentified disclosure characteristics rather 
than analysts’ activities, we do additional tests to isolate the effect 
of analyst forecasts from the effect of the earnings announcement 
on market reactions. We first conduct a two-stage regression 
approach to isolate normal level of analysts’ activities. In the first 
stage, we estimate the expected number of analysts’ response to 
earnings announcement, using identified determinants of analysts’ 
forecasts after earnings announcement (Stickel 1989; Zhang 
2008). In the second stage, we examine the effect of unexpected 
analysts’ response on market reactions. Empirical results show that 
unexpected number of analyst forecasts is positively associated with 
sensitivity of trading volume and stock price reactions to earnings 
announcement. Second, select sample firms that have analyst 
forecasts only on day 0 (or day 1) and have no forecasts on day 1 (or 
day 0). We then examine the market reaction over the sub-periods 
(-1, 0) and (1, 2) separately. We find that the positive relationship 
between sensitivity of stock price and volume reaction to earnings 
announcement and the number of analyst forecasts exists only in 
windows that analyst issue forecasts. These results suggest that it 
is analyst forecasts that affect stock price and trading volume at the 
time of earnings announcements and that our results are likely not 
attributable to other omitted variables.
Our study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. 
First, we contribute to the literature on the role of analysts in 
forming stock price. Theoretical studies suggest that market reaction 
to earnings announcements can be changed by the entrance of 
market experts like analysts (Kim and Verrecchia 1991b, 1994, 
1997). Different from prior studies that focus on the level change 
in trading volume and properties of analyst forecasts (Bamber, 
Barron, and Stober 1997, 1999; Barron, Byard, and Kim 2002; 
Barron, Harris, and Stanford 2005; Kandel and Pearson 1995), we 
focus on difference in sensitivity of market reactions to earnings 
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announcements varying with informational activities of analysts. 
Our results are consistent with theoretical prediction that additional 
information by sophisticated investors helps dissemination of 
earnings news to market (Kim and Verrecchia 1991b, 1994, 1997). 
To our knowledge, our study is first to examine the information 
content of earnings differs with number of analyst forecasts, 
suggesting differential market reactions to earnings announcements 
documented by prior research may be partly attributable to analyst 
announcement period forecasts.  
Second, our evidence provides insight into the role of analysts 
as information interpreters in the market. Ivković and Jegadeesh 
(2004) define the post-announcement period as trading days (2, 
32) with respect to a current quarterly earnings announcement 
and pre-announcement period as days (-30, -1) with respect to the 
next quarterly earnings announcement. They find greater stock 
price reaction to pre-announcement analyst forecast revisions 
than to post-announcement revisions, and conclude that investors 
value analysts as new information producers in the period prior 
to the earnings announcement. However, Ivković and Jegadeesh 
(2004) do not examine the event period (0, 1), even though more 
than 20% of forecasts are revised in this period. Because analyst 
forecasts at the time of earnings announcement are more likely 
analyst interpretations of earnings news, examining the effect of 
analyst forecasts at the time of earnings announcement is critical 
to assessing the role of analysts as information interpreters. Our 
empirical evidence suggests that analyst interpretations of the 
announcement have incremental pricing implications beyond 
earnings. 
Third, our study provides additional evidence on how analysts 
help disseminate new information to the market. Prior empirical 
evidence shows that analyst coverage is positively associated with 
the speed of price adjustment to new information (e.g., Brennan, 
Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan 1993; Elgers, Lo, and Pfeiffer 2001; 
Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000; Zhang 2008). Out study extends a 
prior research by providing more direct link between analysts’ 
forecasting activities and the sensitivity of stock price and trading 
volume reactions to new information from earnings announcements. 
Especially, our empirical results are obtained after controlling for 
analyst coverage, suggesting that forecasts at the time of earnings 
announcement help disseminate new information to market in 
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addition to factors associated with analyst coverage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the 
theoretical background in section 2, describe the research design in 
Section 3, present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis 
in Section 4, and provide our conclusions in Section 5.
2. ThEoRETiCAl BACkgRounD
2.1. Analysts as informed investors
Several empirical studies examine the relation between the 
number of analysts and the speed of stock price adjustment to 
new information, using the number of analysts as a proxy for the 
number of informed traders. Brennan et al. (1993) compose hedge 
portfolios based on the number of analysts following a firm and 
value-weighted or equal-weighted market indices. They find that 
returns on these arbitrage portfolios are negatively related to lagged 
returns on the market indices, indicating that stock prices of firms 
followed by more analysts react more quickly to new information. 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) document a negative relation 
between the number of analysts and estimated adverse selection 
cost, suggesting that competition by informed traders reduces 
information asymmetry and leads to deeper markets. Hong et al. 
(2000) devise a momentum trading strategy based on past six month 
stock returns, firm size and analyst coverage. They find greater 
abnormal stock momentum returns for firms with low analyst 
coverage than for firms with high analyst coverage. Elgers et al. 
(2001) find that abnormal hedge portfolio returns based on analyst 
early-in-the-year earnings forecasts are more pronounced for firms 
with lower analyst coverage. In general, prior empirical evidence 
suggests that the number of analysts following a firm is positively 
associated with the speed of stock price adjustment to information 
contained in stock price.
Prior studies implicitly assume that analysts’ primary role is 
information providers in the market by focusing on analyst coverage. 
However, firm disclosures, such as earnings announcements, are 
important information sources to investors and one of analysts’ 
important roles is to provide interpretation of news from firm 
disclosures for their clients (Schipper 1991). Previous studies, 
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however, do not address the role played by analysts at the event of 
firm disclosures. 
Earnings announcements are an important external information 
event through which firms convey significant new information 
to the market. Evidence shows that analysts tend to revise their 
forecasts immediately after the earnings announcement (Ivković and 
Jegadeesh 2004; Stickel 1989). Although there are many studies 
about the effect of earnings announcements on stock prices (see Lev 
[1989] for a review), there is little research on the role analysts play 
in disseminating information contained in earnings announcements. 
Further, prior empirical studies are silent on the pricing impact 
of earnings announcements when analysts generate information 
concurrent with firm disclosures. 
Several studies examine the association between changes in 
properties of analyst forecasts around earnings announcement 
and the trading volume (Bamber, Barron, and Stober 1997, 
1999; Barron 1995). These studies focus on effect of earnings 
announcement on information asymmetry among investors. In 
order to capture disagreement among investors, these studies 
commonly use analysts’ forecast revisions made within relatively 
long period (usually 45 days prior to and 30 days following an 
earnings announcement). Therefore, their main focus is the overall 
association between trading volume and disagreement in analysts’ 
forecasts. The potential effect of analysts’ forecasts at the time 
of earnings announcement on information content of earnings 
announcement has not been explored yet. 
Related to our study, Zhang (2008) reports more sensitive stock 
price reaction to unexpected earnings for firms with analysts’ 
prompt forecasts following an earnings announcement. However, 
Zhang considers analyst forecast timing as the only attribute of 
analyst forecast properties. In addition, Zhang does not differentiate 
which role of analysts’ new private information production or their 
interpretation of earnings news cause greater market reaction 
to earnings news as his main research focus is post-earnings-
announcement stock return drift. We attempt to provide further 
insight on the role of analysts’ forecasts as information interpreter 
by examining differential market reaction to earnings announcement 
varying with analyst forecasts. 
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2.2.  Effect of Analyst Forecasts on Market Reaction to an Earnings 
Announcement 
Our overall objective is to understand how the activities of 
analysts affect the market reaction to earnings news. Analyst 
forecasts in conjunction with the earnings announcement are 
commonly regarded as analysts’ interpretations of earnings news 
from firm disclosure (Barron, Byard, and Kim 2002; Kandel and 
Pearson 1995; Stickel 1989). Consistent with prior studies (Brennan, 
Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan 1993; Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
1995; Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000), we assume that the amount of 
information produced is positively associated with the number of 
analysts. However, different from prior studies that examine analyst 
coverage, we focus on event of public disclosures and analysts’ 
interpretation role for new information contained in the disclosures. 
We use analysts’ forecasts issued at the time of earnings 
announcement because these forecasts are commonly regarded 
as analysts’ interpretations of earnings news (Schipper 1991). The 
issue of our study is how these analyst forecasts affect transmission 
of earnings news from firm to market. 
Models of trade suggest a potential relation between analyst 
forecasts and trading volume. Especially, models of information-
based trading suggest that trading volume is more likely to 
increase when investors revise their belief differentially (Karpoff 
1986). Earnings announcements convey noisy signals about 
firm performance, where the error arises from the application 
of accounting practices such as conservatism, accrual-based 
estimates, etc. As investors revise their beliefs based on earnings 
news, their belief revisions could be different because of differential 
prior beliefs (Kim and Verrecchia 1991a, 1991b) or differential 
processing of errors contained in earnings news (Kim and Verrecchia 
1994, 1997). The key assumption of these models is that investors 
revise their beliefs based on news from firm disclosures. Thus, the 
more earnings announcements stimulate investors to revise their 
beliefs, the more trading volume is likely to increase. 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) suggest that information 
from informed traders who have superior information relative to 
other market participants affect the market reaction to earnings 
news at the time of earnings announcements. Institutionally, 
10 Seoul Journal of Business
analysts’ interpretation can be thought of as the information 
an analyst gleans by studying the error in accounting reports. 
As analysts’ interpretations are used only in conjunction with 
earnings announcements in a way to reduce errors contained in 
earnings news, analysts’ forecasts stimulates investors’ information 
judgments about earnings news. Thus, analysts’ interpretation 
information will lead investors to trade based on earnings news and 
more trading volume reactions to earnings announcements.
Consistent with prior studies (Brennan, Jegadeesh, and 
Swaminathan 1993; Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995), we 
assume that the number of analyst forecasts at the time of 
earnings announcement is positively associated with the amount 
of information from analysts. We limit analysts’ forecasts to ones 
issued at the event of earnings announcements. These forecasts are 
commonly regarded as analysts’ interpretations of new information 
contained in earnings announcements (Schipper 1991). We expect a 
positive relation between trading volume reaction to earnings news 
and the number of analyst announcement period forecasts. 
We also examine the sensitivity of stock price reaction to 
earnings announcement and analyst forecasting activities. Kim and 
Verrecchia’s (1994) model indicates that earnings announcements 
stimulate information processing activities among investors. 
Because individual investors’ information gathered in conjunction 
with the announcement is aggregated in stock price, stock prices 
are more informative when informed investors generate more 
private information. Similarly, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) also 
predict a positive relation between the amount of information from 
informed investors and the speed with which share price reflects 
new information. Thus, the degree to which the number of analyst 
forecasts at the time of the earnings announcement reflects the 
amount of information related to earnings signals, we expect that 
stock price responses to unexpected earnings news is positively 
related with the number of analyst forecasts.
3. REsEARCh DEsign
3.1 sample selection 
We obtain data on sell-side analyst earnings forecasts for the 
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period January 1996 to December 2010 from the Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) detail tape. We use analyst 
forecast data after 1996 as we need to control for issuance of 
managerial guidance which is available after 1996. We focus on one-
quarter-ahead (q+1) EPS forecasts revised since the current quarter 
(q) earnings announcement. We obtain earnings announcement 
dates from the COMPUSTAT quarterly files and stock return data 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
3.2. Trading Volume Response to stock price Change
We estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression model 
for a sample of quarterly earnings announcements to test the 
relation between analyst forecasting activities and investor trading 
activity: 
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(1) 
where for the firm j’s quarter q earnings announcement on day τ,
CAbVolj,q =  cumulative abnormal trading volume either firm 
specific time-adjusted (CAbVolTj,q) or industry-adjusted 
(CAbVolIj,q) over the four-day window (-1, 2) around the 
earnings announcement date; 
AbsRet j,q=  Cumulative absolute value of stock returns over days (-1, 
2);
SAnnFctj,q =  a dummy variable representing few analyst forecasts. 
It equals 1 if the number of announcement EPS 
forecasts for firm j’s quarter q+1 EPS is less than or 
equal to three, and zero otherwise;
LAnnFctj,q =  a dummy variable representing many analyst forecasts. 
It equals 1 if the number of announcement EPS 
forecasts for firm j’s quarter q+1 EPS is greater than 
or equal to four, and zero otherwise;
Coveragej,q =  log of one plus the number of analysts following firm 
j who issue quarter q+1 EPS forecasts between the 
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quarter q and q+1 earnings announcements; 
MVj,q =  firm size measured as the log of total market value of 
equity at the end of quarter q; 
PBj,q = equity market-to-book ratio at the end of quarter q;
VolRetj,q =  volatility of stock returns measured as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns between 130 days and 
10 days prior to the quarter q earnings announcement 
date;
DGDj,q =  a dummy variables representing an issuance of earnings 
guidance at the time of earnings announcement, and zero 
otherwise;
DCFSj,q =  a dummy variables representing a disclosure of cash 
flow information at the time of earnings announcement, 
and zero otherwise; 
QtrD4j,q  =  a dummy variables representing a 4
th quarter, measured 
as one if the fiscal quarter is 4, and zero otherwise;
NYSEj,q =  a dummy variable representing the NYSE. It equals 1 if 
the firm is traded on the NYSE, and zero otherwise; and
NASDAQj,q =  a dummy variable representing the NASDAQ. It 
equals 1 if the firm is traded on the NASDAQ, and 
zero otherwise.
We use abnormal stock turnover ratio to measure trading volume 
around the earnings announcement. Lo et al. (2000) suggest that 
turnover, defined as shares traded divided by shares outstanding, 
is a better measure of trading activity. We measure four-day 
cumulative abnormal turnover by summing abnormal daily turnover 
during the event period. Following prior studies (Bamber 1986; 
Morse 1981), we use abnormal stock turnover (CAbVol), computed 
as daily turnover less expected turnover. We use two measures of 
expected turnover. The first measure is average turnover for the firm 
during the non-announcement period, defined as days (-40, -10) 
relative to the quarter q earnings announcement (CAbTVolT). The 
second measure of expected turnover is the average turnover for 
firms in the same three-digit SIC code industry on the same trading 
day (CAbTVolI). 
We use the four-days event window (days (-1, 2)) to capture the 
market reaction to the earnings announcement and the analyst 
forecasts made on days 0 and 1. In additional tests, we also use 
the three-days window (-1, 1), which is commonly used by previous 
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empirical research, to assess the sensitivity of our empirical results 
to this research design choice. The results are similar. 
The primary test variable is the number of analyst announcement 
forecasts (AnnFct), which we define as the number of new or revised 
forecasts for the next quarterly EPS issued within two trading days 
following the current earnings announcement (i.e., days 0 and 1). 
To test whether the volume reaction systematically differs with the 
number of announcement forecasts, we include two dummy variables, 
SAnnFct and LAnnFct, for the number of announcement forecasts, 
and interact these dummy variables with absolute value of price 
changes (AbsRet). We also estimate the relation between the number 
of announcement forecasts and stock return using a continuous 
measure of the number of announcement period forecasts.
Theoretical studies suggest that trading volume at the time of 
earnings announcement is affected by the magnitude of stock price 
change and the differential beliefs about earnings signals for future 
firm performance among investors (Kim and Verrecchia 1994). We 
measure the magnitude of stock price change by summing the 
absolute value of daily stock returns during the four-days event 
window (AbsRet). We test whether volume response to stock price 
change during the earnings announcement varies with analyst 
forecasting activities. 
The coefficient on AbsRet represents the volume response to stock 
price change for observations with no announcement period analyst 
forecasts. The coefficients of interest are α4 and α5, which reflect 
the difference between volume responses for observations with no 
announcement period analyst forecasts and observations with few 
and many announcement period forecasts, respectively. We expect 
α4 to be positive and α5 to be greater than α4.
We control for other factors that have been identified as deter-
minants of trading volume. Prior studies shows that firm size 
(Amihud 2002; Atiase 1985), market-to-book ratio (Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman 2001; Datar, Y. Naik, and Radcliffe 
1998), and prior return volatility (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995) affect trading volume. Trading 
volume is also affected by the pre-announcement information 
environment (Verrecchia 2001). We include market value of 
equity (MV) and stock return volatility (VolRet) as proxies for 
information environment (e.g., Jiang, Lee, and Zhang 2005; Zhang 
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2006).1)  Volatility of stock returns is also related to transaction 
costs (Barnea and Logue 1975; Hamilton 1978; Stoll 1978). We also 
include dummy variables of disclosing cash flow information at the 
time of earnings announcement (DCFS) and issuance of earnings 
guidance (DGD) as firms disclosing these information may have 
differential disclosure practice and differential pricing impact of 
firm disclosures (Baber, Chen, and Kang 2006; Beyer 2009; Rogers 
and Van Buskirk 2013). Because prior studies find greater market 
response to fourth quarter earnings news than to other quarters’ 
earnings news (e.g., Landsman and Maydew 2002), we also interact 
the fourth quarter  dummy variable with price change. In order to 
control for potential fixed effect of stock market, we include dummy 
variables of stock markets (NYSE and NASDAQ).
Note that we include the analyst coverage (Coverage) in all 
regression models because the number of analysts’ announcement 
forecasts is positively correlated with analyst coverage. By including 
Coverage, we control not only for potential effect of analyst coverage 
but also for differences in firm information environment varying 
with analyst coverage (Bhushan 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1996). 
In addition, by controlling for analyst coverage, the effect of analyst 
forecasts at the time of earnings announcement on trading volume 
is incremental (or additional) to the factors associated with analyst 
coverage. We add value of one to the number of analyst coverage to 
compute the log value of coverage.
3.3. stock price response to forecast revisions
We estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression model 
to test whether analyst forecasting activities affect stock price 
sensitivity to earnings announcements: 
(2)
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  1) We do not include analyst forecast dispersion because our sample includes firms 
without analyst coverage. We repeat the test on a sample that only includes 
firms with analyst coverage to control for analyst forecast dispersion. Our 
main results do not change after including analyst forecast dispersion. We also 
use the standard deviation of earnings volatility to measure prior information 
uncertainty, but the results does not change.
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where, for the firm j’s quarter q earnings announcement on day τ,
CARj,q =  value-weighted market-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
stock return (in percentage) over the four-days window (-1, 
2) around the earnings announcement date;
UEj,q =  unexpected earnings measured as actual earnings per 
share (EPS) minus the latest individual analyst forecast 
before the earnings announcement, divided by stock price 
at the end of the quarter;
AbsUEj,q = absolute value of unexpected earnings (UE);
Lossj,q =  a dummy variable representing a negative earnings, 
measured as one if the EPS is negative, and zero 
otherwise; and
Specialj,q =  absolute value of restructuring charges deflated by 
total sales at the end of quarter q.
Since the stock reaction to an earnings announcement 
depends on the magnitude of new information contained in the 
announcement, we need proxy for unexpected earnings. We 
measure unexpected earnings (UE ) by the difference between actual 
EPS and the latest individual analyst forecast before the quarter q 
earnings announcement. This is consistent Zhang (2008), so that 
we can compare our results with those of Zhang. We deflate the 
forecast error by the quarter end stock price. Because the demand 
for analyst interpretation services is endogenously determined, 
many of the determinants of analyst forecasting activities may also 
be determinants of the ERC (Stickel 1989; Zhang 2008). For this 
reason, we control for ERC determinants and allow UE to vary with 
these ERC determinants. We include market-to-book ratio (PB ) to 
control for growth opportunities, and return volatility (VolRet ) to 
control for firm risk and uncertainty of future cash flows (Zhang 
2006). We use Loss and Special to control for earnings persistence 
because prior research indicates that earnings of loss firms and 
restructuring firms are less persistent (Hayn 1995). We include 
absolute value of forecast error (AbsUE ) to control for nonlinearity in 
ERC (Freeman and Tse 1992) and log of firm market value (MV ) to 
16 Seoul Journal of Business
control for differences in firm size (Easton and Zmijewski 1989). We 
also include dummy variables for fourth quarter (DQtr4 ), disclosure 
of cash flow information (DCFS), and managerial earnings guidance 
(DGD). We also include dummy variables to control for fiscal quarter 
and year fixed effects. 
4. EMpiRiCAl REsulTs
4.1. univariate Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample firms used in 
this study. There are 115,761 firm-quarter observations that satisfy 
all the data requirements between 1996 and 2010. The average 
(median) number of announcement forecasts issued within two 
trading days following an announcement (AnnFct) is 3.55 (2.0). The 
average (median) number of analysts following a firm each quarter 
(Coverage) is 6.93 (5.0). On average, about 50% of analysts issue 
their forecasts during the announcement event window.2) The mean 
value of cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR ) is 0.0036 and that 
of cumulative absolute stock return (AbsRet ) is 0.1155. As expected, 
the means of both firm- and industry-adjusted abnormal trading 
volume around earnings announcements are significantly positive 
(0.0224 and 0.0312, respectively). Average unexpected earnings 
(UE ) is 0.0004 and average absolute unexpected earnings (AbsUE ) 
is 0.0036. The average market value of firms is $5,923 million 
and about 20 percent of firms experience negative earnings (Loss). 
Average value of restructuring charges (Special ) is 0.49% of sales. 
About 16% of firms disclose earnings guidance (DGD) at the same 
time with earnings announcements and 93.6% of firms disclose 
cash flow information (DCFS ). 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for sample firms with 
zero (AnnFct = 0), few (1<=AnnFct<=3) and many number of 
announcement forecasts (AnnFct>=4). We have 31,579 observations 
  2) The frequency of analyst forecasts immediately after earnings announcement is 
higher than that of Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) because they use only forecast 
revisions, whereas we use all forecasts issued. Our samle period also include 
longer periods of post Regulation Fair Disclosure effective in 2000 when analysts 
are more likely to rely on earings announcement to revise their forecasts (Hahn 
and Song 2012).
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without announcement period forecasts and 43,106 observations 
with few analyst forecasts and 41,148 observations with many 
announcement forecasts. One of our sample selection criteria is that 
at least one analyst follow a firm in order to compute unexpected 
earnings. This requirement explains why we have more observations 
with announcement forecasts than without announcement 
forecasts. 
The mean (median) value of CAR is increasing with the number 
of analyst forecasts. Both the mean and median value of abnormal 
stock turnover (CAbVol) and stock price change (AbsRet) for 
announcement forecast firms are increasing with the number of 
announcement forecasts. However, untabulated t-test results show 
that there is no significant difference in average value of CAR, 
AbsRet between groups of few and many analyst forecasts. Not 
surprisingly, announcement forecast sample firms have larger size 
(MV ), market-to-book ratio (PB ), and analyst coverage (Coverage), 
and lower value of unexpected earnings (AbsUE ), absolute amount 
of restructuring charges (Special ) and the frequency of negative 
earnings (Loss). 
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics between January 1990 and 2010
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for the full sample
Variable N Mean  Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl
AnnFct 115,761 3.5542 4.3615 0.0000 2.0000 5.0000 
CAR 115,761 0.0036 0.0818 -0.0377 0.0022 0.0448 
CabVolT 115,761 0.0224 0.0339 0.0017 0.0106 0.0309 
CabTVolI 115,234 0.0312 0.0446 0.0022 0.0155 0.0449 
UE 115,761 0.0004 0.0083 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0018 
AbsUE 115,761 0.0036 0.0075 0.0004 0.0012 0.0033 
AbsRet 115,761 0.1155 0.0811 0.0576 0.0946 0.1509 
MV 115,761 5,923 20,811 312 962 3,289 
PB 115,761 3.1159 3.0678 1.4361 2.1943 3.5742 
Coverage 115,761 6.9277 5.9396 3.0000 5.0000 10.0000 
VolRet 115,761 0.0303 0.0167 0.0184 0.0262 0.0378 
Loss 115,761 0.2064 0.4047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Special 115,761 0.0049 0.0284 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
QtrD4 115,761 0.2291 0.4203 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DGD 115,761 0.2049 0.4036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DCFS 115,761 0.9359 0.2450 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table 1. (continued)















Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
AnnFct - - - 1.79 2.00 0.80 8.12 7.00 4.36 
CAR 0.0027 0.0007 0.0777 0.0039 0.0027 0.0838 0.0040 0.0031 0.0829 
CAbVolT 0.0138 0.0048 0.0279 0.0190 0.0085 0.0311 0.0325 0.0201 0.0382 
CAbTVolI 0.0185 0.0063 0.0355 0.0257 0.0119 0.0405 0.0467 0.0309 0.0502 
UE -0.0000 0.0003 0.0100 0.0004 0.0004 0.0085 0.0008 0.0005 0.0063 
AbsUE 0.0044 0.0014 0.0089 0.0037 0.0012 0.0077 0.0028 0.0010 0.0057 
AbsRet 0.1101 0.0885 0.0820 0.1178 0.0966 0.0826 0.1173 0.0972 0.0787 
MV 2,133 361 10,371 3,276 716 12,932 11,600 2,744 30,174 
PB 2.8120 1.9641 2.8404 2.9864 2.0997 2.9540 3.4848 2.4970 3.3068 
Coverage 2.5205 2.0000 2.7696 5.0630 4.0000 3.2948 12.2612 11.0000 5.9174 
VolRet 0.0321 0.0283 0.0175 0.0309 0.0269 0.0168 0.0283 0.0244 0.0157 
Loss 0.2298 0.0000 0.4207 0.2133 0.0000 0.4097 0.1811 0.0000 0.3851 
Special 0.0054 0.0000 0.0311 0.0052 0.0000 0.0297 0.0041 0.0000 0.0247 
QtrD4 0.2408 0.0000 0.4276 0.2158 0.0000 0.4114 0.2340 0.0000 0.4234 
DGD 0.1311 0.0000 0.3375 0.1751 0.0000 0.3801 0.2926 0.0000 0.4550 
DCF 0.8816 1.0000 0.3231 0.9394 1.0000 0.2386 0.9739 1.0000 0.1596 
Note:
AnnFct =  number of analysts’ announcement forecast that are issued during event days (0, 1) 
with respect to quarter q earrings announcement. We use log value of AnnFct plus one 
in multivariate regression model;
CAR =  value-weighted market-adjusted cumulative abnormal stock return (in percentage) over 
the four-day window (-1, 2) around the earnings announcement date;
CAbVolT =  firm-specific non-announcement period adjusted cumulative abnormal turnover ratio 
around quarter q earnings announcement date;
CAbVolI =  industry-adjusted cumulative abnormal turnover ratio around quarter q earnings 
announcement date; 
UE =  unexpected earnings measured as actual earnings per share (EPS) minus the latest 
individual analyst forecast before the earnings announcement, divided by stock price at 
the end of the quarter;
AbsRet =  cumulative absolute stock returns around earnings announcement measured by 
summing  each absolute stock return during event days [-1, 2] with respect to quarter 
q earnings announcement;
PB = equity market-to-book ratio at the end of quarter q;
AbsUE = absolute value of UE;
MV = firm size measured by the log of total market value of firm at the end of quarter q;
Coverage =  number of analysts following firm j who issue quarter q+1 EPS forecasts between 
the quarter q and q+1 earnings announcements. We use log value of coverage plus 
one in multivariate regression model;
VolRet =  volatility of stock returns measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
during event days (-40, -10) with respect to quarter q earnings announcement date;
Loss =  a dummy variable representing a negative earnings, measured as one if the EPS is 
negative, and zero otherwise;
Special = restructuring charges deflated by total assets at the end of quarter q; 
DGD =  a dummy variables representing an issuance of earnings guidance at the time of 
earnings announcement, and zero otherwise;
DCFS =  a dummy variables representing a disclosure of cash flow information at the time of 
earnings announcement, and zero otherwise; 
NYSE  =  a dummy variable representing the NYSE. It equals 1 if the firm is traded on the NYSE, 
and zero otherwise; and
NASDAQ =  a dummy variable representing the NASDAQ. It equals 1 if the firm is traded on the 
NASDAQ, and zero otherwise; and
QtrD4 =  dummy variables for 4th quarter, measured as one if the fiscal quarter is 4 and zero 
otherwise.
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4.2. Regression Results
Table 2 presents estimation results for three variations of equation 
(1). Model 1 regresses CAbVol on AbsRet and its interaction with 
the two dummy variables for the number of announcement period 
forecasts, SAnnFct and LAnnFct, for the full sample of observations 
that includes observations with and without announcement period 
forecasts. This formulation allows us to compare the volume-
return relation for observations with no announcement forecasts, 
observations with few announcement forecasts, and observations 
with many announcement forecasts. Model 2 treats the number 
of announcement forecasts as a continuous variable rather than 
as a binary variable. In model 3, it ignores observations with no 
announcement forecasts and focuses on observations with few and 
many announcement forecasts. 
The model 1 results indicate that the coefficient on AbsRet is 
significantly positive at the one percent level (0.0805, t = 9.86). 
This is consistent with the predictions of analytical studies that 
trading volume is positively related with price changes (Verrecchia 
2001). The coefficient on SAnnFct is significantly negative (-0.0013, 
t = -3.08), but that on LAnnFct is significantly positive (0.0025, 
t = 4.32). This result indicates that the overall trading volume is 
positively associated with the number of analysts’ announcement 
forecasts, suggesting that more analyst forecasting activities 
could increase the quantity of information available over the event 
period. The coefficients on the interaction terms SAnnFct*AbsRet 
and LAnnFct*AbsRet are 0.0122 (t = 0.419) and 0.0420 (t = 10.65), 
respectively, and both coefficients are statistically and economically 
significant at one percent level. In addition, the difference in 
magnitudes of these two coefficients is significantly positive 
(0.0298, p < 0.01), indicating that the relation between trading 
volume reaction and price change is increasing with the number 
of announcement period forecasts. These results demonstrate 
that the impact of stock price change on trading volume is greater 
when analysts issue more forecasts at the time of the earnings 
announcement and indicate that information asymmetry among 
investors at the time of the earnings announcement increases with 
the number of announcement period forecasts.
Model 2 estimates equation (1) using continuous value of log value 
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Table 2. Multivariate Regression of abnormal trading volume around 
quarterly earnings announcement on the change in stock price and the 
number of announcement forecasts 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 1 , 5 , 1 , 6 ,
9 , 7 , 1 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , , 12 ,   + +
j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q
j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q
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PB Coverage VolRet DGD DCF MV AbsRet PB A
α α α α α α α
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QtrD AbsRet NYSE NASDAQ YearDummies QuarterDummi
α α α α α
α α α
++ × + × × + × + ×
+ × + + +∑ ,j qes e+∑
Variables
Pooled Sample Pooled sample
Sample firms with 
announcement 
forecasts 
Estimate t Value Estimate t Value Estimate t Value
Intercept 0.0065 5.52 *** 0.0064 5.43 ***
SAnnFct -0.0013 -3.08 *** -0.0018 -1.09  
LAnnFct 0.0025 4.32 *** 0.0000 -0.01  
AbsRet 0.0805 9.86 *** 0.0863 10.6 ***
SannFct*AbsRet 0.0122 4.19 *** 0.1290 11.39 ***
LannFct*AbsRet 0.0420 10.65 *** 0.1543 12.42 ***
lnAnnFct 0.0026 9.3 ***
lnAnnFct*AbsRet 0.0299 15.23 ***
MV -0.0009 -7.21 *** -0.0009 -7.39 *** -0.0014 -9.01 ***
PB 0.0001 2.50 ** 0.0001 2.2 ** 0.0002 3.24 ***
Coverage 0.0013 4.18 *** 0.0001 0.23  0.0045 9.76 ***
VolRet -0.1073 -9.23 *** -0.1109 -9.56 *** -0.0662 -4.51 ***
DGD 0.0022 5.62 *** 0.0021 5.52 *** 0.0024 5.43 ***
DSCF -0.0026 -4.27 *** -0.0026 -4.29 *** -0.0019 -2.23 **
MV*AbsRet 0.0108 12.47 *** 0.0104 12.01 *** 0.0074 6.58 ***
PB*AbsRet 0.0026 8.24 *** 0.0027 8.62 *** 0.0033 8.73 ***
Coverage*AbsRet 0.0192 8.78 *** 0.0105 4.53 *** 0.0280 8.64 ***
VolRet*AbsRet -1.7860 -31.86 *** -1.7663 -31.58 *** -2.0807 -30.21 ***
DGD*AbsRet -0.0060 -2.25 ** -0.0074 -2.78 *** -0.0068 -2.19 **
DSCF*AbsRet 0.0397 6.26 *** 0.0364 5.74 *** 0.0172 1.93 *
QtrD4*AbsRet 0.0354 13.87 *** 0.0346 13.58 *** 0.0376 12.11 ***
NYSE 0.0034 5.61 *** 0.0032 5.4 *** 0.0042 4.68 ***
NASDAQ 0.0072 12.24 *** 0.0068 11.63 *** 0.0083 9.41 ***
N 115,761 115,761 84,164




0.0298 101.26 *** 0.0253 81.43 ***
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
SAnnFct is dummy variables of value one if the number of analyst forecasts at the 
time of earnings announcement (AnnFct) is greater than zero and less or equal to 
three, zero otherwise; LAnnFct is dummy variables of value one if AnnFct is greater 
than four, zero otherwise. lnAnnFct is the log of one plus the number of analysts’ 
announcement forecast. All models include year and quarter dummies. Please see 
table 1 for definition of variables. 
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of one plus the number of announcement forecasts (lnAnnFct).3) 
The coefficient on the interaction between lnAnnFct *AbsRet is 
significantly positive (0.0299, t = 15.23), suggesting that trading 
volume reaction to stock returns is increasing with analysts’ 
activities. Model 3 limit sample firms to ones that have at least one 
announcement forecast. The coefficients on SAnnFct*AbsRet and 
LAnnFct*AbsRet are each significantly positive and the coefficient on 
LannFct*AbsRet is greater than the coefficient on SannFct*AbsRet 
(0.0253, p < 0.01). These results are consistent with the results for 
model 1. 
Regarding the control variables, volume response sensitivity to 
stock return is increasing with firm size (MV), market-to-book ratio 
(PB) and analyst coverage (Coverage), and cash flow information 
disclosure (DCFS) and decreasing with return volatility (VolRet) and 
issuance of firm earnings guidance (DGD). 
4.3. uncertainty of analyst forecasts and volume reaction
If analysts’ forecasts play the role of interpretation of earnings 
news, analysts’ interpretation information is used only in 
conjunction with earnings news and conveys information regarding 
noise in earnings signals (Kim and Verrecchia 1997). Uncertainty 
in analysts’ interpretation may affect pricing effect of earnings 
announcement. For example, less uncertainty in analysts’ 
interpretation regarding earnings news can give investors better 
understanding of signals of current earnings regarding firm future 
performance. This will more stimulate investors’ processing of 
earnings news to revise their estimate of firm value, resulting in 
larger trading volume reaction to earnings announcements. 
We measure the uncertainty in analyst forecasts’ interpretation by 
forecast dispersion. Analyst forecast dispersion is commonly used as 
proxy for either uncertainty in analyst forecasts positively correlated 
with uncertainty in earnings (Imhoff and Lobo 1992; Jiang, Lee, and 
Zhang 2005; Zhang 2006). Alternatively, analyst forecast dispersion 
may also reflect diversity in beliefs among investors (Bamber, 
Barron, and Stober 1997; Barron 1995). More diverse interpretations 
among investors is positively associated with trading volume (Kim 
  3) We add one to the number of analyst forecasts to take log value of the number of 
analyst forecasts.
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and Verrecchia 1994, 1997). Thus,  the degree to which analyst 
forecast dispersion reflect the uncertainty or diversity in analyst 
forecasts, the effect of dispersion on trading volume will change.
We measure analyst forecast dispersion by the standard deviation 
of analyst forecasts issued at the time of earnings announcement, 
deflated by quarter end stock price. In order to measure dispersion, 
we require a minimum of three forecasts at the time of earnings 
announcements. Then, we assign the firms with dispersion 
greater (less) than sample median value of dispersion to high (low) 
dispersion sub-sample in each year. 
Panel A in table 3 presents the descriptive statistics on variables 
based on analyst forecast dispersion. In general, those firms 
with low dispersion tend to have large number of announcement 
forecasts (6.67 versus 7.54). Although mean and median values 
are significantly different, the differences are not economically 
significant. Not surprisingly, firms with lower dispersion tend to be 
larger (MV), have smaller average value of earnings surprise (UE and 
AbsUE) and stock price change (AbsRet), return volatility (VolRet).
Firms with high dispersion have lower firm-specific adjusted 
trading volume (CAbVolT, 0.0301) than firms with lower dispersion 
(0.0311). On the other hand, the industry-adjusted trading volume 
(CAbVolI) is larger for firms with high dispersion (0.0444 versus 
0.0429). Lager value of CAbVolT for low dispersion firms looks like 
inconsistent with prior evidence that firms with higher dispersion 
tend to have higher trading volume (Bamber, Barron, and Stober 
1997, 1999; Barron 1995). Note that this is univariate result without 
controlling for other factors. We find the level of change in trading 
volume is increasing with dispersion in multivariate regression as 
we discussed later.4) 
Panel B documents results of regression of trading volume on 
the number of analyst forecasts (lnAnnFct) and stock price change 
  4) We also find that this difference is because of sample selection. Prior studies 
require sample firms to have a minimum number of revisions made by the same 
analysts around an earnings announcement, resulting in sample firms followed 
by a larger number of analysts who are active in forecast revisions. When we 
limit our sample firms to ones with large number of forecasts, we also find that 
the level of trading volume is increasing with dispersion. For example, when we 
require a minimum of seven forecasts, the mean (median) value of abnormal 
trading volume for high dispersion firms is 0.0373 (0.0247), while that of low 
dispersion firms is 0.0362 (0.0237). However, our empirical results of sensitivity 
of volume reaction to stock price changes do not change for this sample.
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(AbsRet). As our sample firms are limited to firms with a minimum 
of three forecasts, we use continuous variables of lnAnnFct rather 
than dummy variables. We find positive coefficients on stock price 
changes (AbsRet) and the number of announcement forecasts 
(lnAnnFct*AbsRet). In general, results of regression of trading 
volume and the number of analyst forecasts for both small and large 
dispersion groups are similar to our previous test results. 
Regarding difference in two samples, we find the magnitudes 
of coefficients on Intercept and the number of analyst forecasts 
(lnAnnFct) is larger for large dispersion firms. For example, 
coefficient on lnAnnFct for high dispersion firms is 0.0075 and that 
for low dispersion firms is 0.0024. The difference in the magnitude 
of coefficients is significant at one percent level (0.0050, t = 2.88). 
In addition, the magnitude of intercepts for high dispersion firms is 
larger than that of low dispersion (0.0097, t = 1.67). These results 
are consistent with prior evidence that the overall level change 
in abnormal trading volume is positively associated with forecast 
dispersion (Bamber, Barron, and Stober 1997, 1999; Barron 1995). 
The sensitivity of volume reaction to stock price change (AbsRet), 
however, is higher for firms with low dispersion (0.1322 versus 
0.2567). Note that prior studies examining the effect of forecast 
dispersion on trading volume do not examine the sensitivity of 
volume reactions. The magnitude of coefficient on lnAnnFct*AbsRet 
is significantly larger for low dispersion firms (0.0724) than high 
dispersion firms (0.0524). The difference in magnitude of coefficients 
is significantly different at ten percent level (difference = -0.0200, t = 
-1.66). The degree to which forecast dispersion reflects uncertainty 
in analysts’ interpretations of earnings news, the result suggests 
that investors’ trading based on earnings news is decreasing with 
uncertainty in analysts’ interpretations. 
The effect of analyst forecast dispersion on trading volume shows 
both properties of proxies for diversity in investor beliefs and for 
uncertainty in earnings signals. These results could be because 
analyst forecast dispersion has both properties of diverse beliefs 
among individuals or uncertainty in common information (Barron et 
al. 1998).
In general, empirical results suggest that analysts’ announcement 
forecasts increase the market reaction to the new information 
contained in earnings announcement. Especially, analysts’ less 
uncertain forecasts help investors incorporate new information. 
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These results are more consistent with analysts’ interpretation role 
that analysts’ interpreting forecasts help investors better understand 
the earnings signals. Our results also provide complimentary 
evidence that firms with small analyst forecast dispersion tend to 
experience less post-earnings stock return drift (Jiang, Lee, and 
Zhang 2005; Zhang 2006). Our results show that more trading for 
firms with small dispersion imply that market are more likely to 
impound new information from earnings announcements quickly. 
Our empirical results also imply that the increased trading 
volume associated with analyst forecasts may increase market 
liquidity. Previous studies frequently measure market liquidity as 
the ratio of the sum of the daily volume to the sum of the absolute 
return (Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach 1997; Chordia, 
Table 3. Comparison of trading volume reaction to stock price changes 
between high and analyst forecast dispersion 
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Panel A. Descriptive statistics conditional on analyst forecast dispersion 







Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
AnnFct 6.67 5.00 7.54 6.00 0.87 *** 1.00 ***
CAR 0.0017 0.0014 0.0065 0.0049 0.0048 *** 0.0035 ***
CAbVolT 0.0301 0.0177 0.0311 0.0189 0.0011 *** 0.0012 ***
CAbTVolI 0.0444 0.0288 0.0429 0.0271 -0.0015 *** -0.0017 ***
UE 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0001 ** -0.0003 ***
AbsUE 0.0044 0.0020 0.0012 0.0006 -0.0032 *** -0.0014 ***
AbsRet 0.1267 0.1056 0.1086 0.0905 -0.0181 *** -0.0151 ***
MV 6,666 1,522 13,647 3,310 6,981 *** 1,787 ***
PB 2.6953 1.9329 4.1500 3.0439 1.4547 *** 1.1111 ***
Coverage 10.73 9.00 11.56 10.00 0.8279 *** 1.0000 ***
VolRet 0.0316 0.0273 0.0255 0.0223 -0.0061 *** -0.0051 ***
Loss 0.2885 0.0000 0.0807 0.0000 -0.2078 *** 0.0000 ***
Special 0.0052 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 -0.0020 *** 0.0000 ***
QtrD4 0.2364 0.0000 0.2265 0.0000 -0.0099 *** 0.0000 ***
DGD 0.2104 0.0000 0.3414 0.0000 0.1311 *** 0.0000 ***
DCFS 0.9795 1.0000 0.9625 1.0000 -0.0169 *** 0.0000 ***
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Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman 2001; Cooper, Groth, and Avera 
1985; Datar, Y. Naik, and Radcliffe 1998; Haugen and Baker 1996; 
Khan and Baker 1993). The coefficient on absolute stock price 
change could be interpreted as the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
measure of market liquidity. Our results are consistent with the 
prediction by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) that the entrance of 
Table 3. (continued)
Panel B. Comparison of trading volume response to stock price 
change based on analyst forecast dispersion at the time of earnings 
announcements 
Variables
High Dispersion Low Dispersion
Difference 
(High – Low)
Estimate t Value Estimate t Value Estimate t Value
Intercept -0.0028 -0.69  -0.0126 -3.10 *** 0.0097 1.67 *
AbsRet 0.1322 5.15 *** 0.2567 10.40 *** -0.1245 -3.49 ***
lnAnnFct 0.0075 5.71 *** 0.0024 2.12 ** 0.0050 2.88 ***
lnAnnFct*AbsRet 0.0524 6.08 *** 0.0724 8.63 *** -0.0200 -1.66 *
MV -0.0025 -7.20 *** -0.0019 -6.21 *** -0.0006 -1.32  
PB 0.0001 0.63  0.0004 3.90 *** -0.0003 -1.73 *
Coverage 0.0023 1.64  0.0045 3.54 *** -0.0023 -1.21  
VolRet -0.1336 -4.69 *** 0.1178 3.75 *** -0.2513 -5.88 ***
DGD 0.0027 2.86 *** 0.0015 2.10 ** 0.0011 0.96  
DSCF -0.0010 -0.39  -0.0003 -0.18  -0.0006 -0.21  
MV*AbsRet 0.0158 7.06 *** -0.0117 -4.99 *** 0.0275 8.43 ***
PB*AbsRet 0.0023 2.61 *** 0.0037 5.96 *** -0.0015 -1.39  
Coverage*AbsRet -0.0151 -1.64  0.0107 1.14  -0.0258 -1.95 *
VolRet*AbsRet -1.8836 -14.72 *** -2.9276 -19.61 *** 1.0440 5.25 ***
DGD*AbsRet -0.0143 -2.42 ** -0.0019 -0.34  -0.0124 -1.53  
DSCF*AbsRet -0.0282 -1.36  -0.0134 -0.72  -0.0148 -0.53  
QtrD4*AbsRet 0.0298 5.16 *** 0.0273 4.41 *** 0.0025 0.29  
NYSE 0.0055 2.62 *** 0.0091 3.23 *** -0.0036 -1.01  
NASDAQ 0.0086 4.09 *** 0.0139 4.95 *** -0.0054 -1.50  
N 25,451 25,759 51,210
R2 0.2534 0.3154 0.2742
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Forecast dispersion is measured by standard deviation of analyst forecasts issued 
at the time of earnings announcements, deflated by quarter end stock price. Firms 
with dispersion value greater (less) than median value of dispersion in each year 
are assigned to high (low) dispersion firms. lnAnnFct is log of one plus the number 
of analysts’ announcement forecast. All models include year and quarter dummy 
variables. Please see table 1 for definition of other variables.
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informed traders in the market increases  the informativeness of 
stock prices, leading to higher market liquidity. 
4.4. stock Return Response to Earnings Announcements
In this section, we investigate how analysts’ forecasting activities 
affect the sensitivity of stock price response to earnings news. 
Trading reveals traders’ information that is ultimately incorporated 
into stock price (Kim and Verrecchia 1991a, 1991b). Thus, more 
trading will lead stock price to reflect information available in 
the market, which results in more quick incorporation of new 
information. As we find greater trading volume reaction to earnings 
announcement when more number of analysts issue forecasts, we 
examine how greater trading volume results in more sensitive price 
reaction to earnings announcement.
The model 1 results indicate that the coefficient on UE is 
significantly positive at the one percent level (3.2288). The 
coefficients on the interaction terms SAnnFct*UE and LAnnFct*UE 
are 0.4696 (t = 6.46) and 1.0296 (t = 9.12), respectively, and both 
coefficients are statistically and economically significant. Zhang 
(2008) finds that the ERC is higher when analysts issue forecasts 
at the time of earnings announcement. We further show that the 
sensitivity of stock price reaction to earnings news is increasing with 
the number of analysts’ activities. The magnitude of the coefficient 
relating CAR and UE is increasing in the number of announcement 
forecasts. The difference between the coefficients on LAnnFct*UE 
and SAnnFct*UE is 0.5588 (p < 0.01), and is statistically significantly 
greater from zero. 
Regarding the control variables, analyst coverage (Coverage), 
issuance of earnings guidance (DGD) and cash flow information 
(DCFS), and market-to-book ratio (PB) have significantly positive 
effects on the returns-earnings relation, while restructuring charge 
(Special), negative earnings (Loss), and stock return volatility (VolRet) 
have a significantly negative effect. In general, these results are 
consistent with expectations. We repeat the test using continuous 
variables of the number of analyst forecasts (model 2) and sample 
firms with analyst forecasts (model 3). The major results do not 
change with regression model.
We also examine how uncertainty in analyst forecasts affects the 
stock price reaction to earnings news and analyst forecasts. Similar 
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Table 4. Regression results of stock price reaction to unexpected earnings 
and analyst forecasts
Panel A. Stock price response to unexpected earnings and the number 
of analyst forecasts that are issued within two trading days following an 
earnings announcement
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 1 , 10 , 5 , 1 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 1 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 1
 + 
     + +
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+ × + × + × +∑ ,   j quarterDummies e+∑
Variables
Pooled sample




Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Intercept 0.0030 1.59  0.0031 1.63  
SAnnFct 0.0003 0.40  -0.0013 -0.54  
LAnnFct -0.0009 -0.97  -0.0025 -0.93  
UE 3.2288 13.36 *** 3.3182 13.75 ***
SAnnFct*UE 0.4696 6.46 *** 3.8509 10.5 ***
LAnnFct*UE 1.0296 9.12 *** 4.3545 10.92 ***
lnAnnFct -0.0009 -1.83 *
lnAnnFct*UE 0.5477 9.62 ***
AbsUE -0.0427 -1.12  -0.0441 -1.16  -0.0290 -0.58  
Loss -0.0126 -19.11 *** -0.0126 -19.12 *** -0.0128 -16.01 ***
Special -0.0315 -3.80 *** -0.0313 -3.77 *** -0.0344 -3.37 ***
Coverage 0.0003 0.69  0.0007 1.25  0.0003 0.45  
MV -0.0007 -3.56 *** -0.0007 -3.58 *** -0.0005 -2.00 **
PB 0.0000 -0.13  0.0000 -0.11  0.0002 1.76 *
VolRet -0.0757 -3.99 *** -0.0749 -3.95 *** -0.0228 -0.98  
DGD 0.0014 2.38 ** 0.0014 2.38 ** 0.0009 1.26  
DCFS 0.0038 3.75 *** 0.0039 3.84 *** 0.0034 2.42 **
AbsUE*UE -46.7840 -35.28 *** -46.7129 -35.22 *** -56.3124 -32.36 ***
Loss*UE -1.0452 -14.84 *** -1.0528 -14.95 *** -1.2819 -13.96 ***
Special*UE -1.5137 -2.60 *** -1.5266 -2.63 *** -1.6267 -2.16 **
Coverage*UE 0.2379 4.06 *** 0.1689 2.71 *** 0.2287 2.5 **
MV*UE -0.1314 -5.80 *** -0.1352 -5.96 *** -0.1118 -3.57 ***
PB*UE 0.0213 1.93 * 0.0207 1.88 * 0.0326 2.07 **
VolRet*UE -5.5140 -4.07 *** -5.5297 -4.08 *** -5.6760 -3.29 ***
DGD*UE 0.1806 2.02 ** 0.1735 1.95 * 0.3870 3.36 ***
DCFS*UE 1.2598 6.29 *** 1.2547 6.27 *** 1.5924 5.27 ***
QtrD4*UE -0.5410 -8.37 *** -0.5440 -8.42 *** -0.8097 -9.6 ***
N 115,761 115,761 84,164




0.5588 38.25 *** 0.5025 22.81 ***
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Table 4. (continued)
Panel B. Comparison of stock price response to unexpected earnings based 
on analyst forecast dispersion at the time of earnings announcements 
Variables
High Dispersion Low Dispersion
Difference 
(High – Low)
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Intercept -0.0022 -0.38  -0.0028 -0.62  0.0007 0.09  
UE 4.4676 6.32 *** 6.0707 2.18 ** -1.6030 -0.52  
lnAnnFct -0.0077 -3.79 *** -0.0020 -1.11  -0.0057 -2.11 **
lnAnnFct*UE 0.6839 2.84 *** 2.6993 3.49 *** -2.0154 -2.32 **
AbsUE -0.0742 -0.85  -1.5760 -5.93 *** 1.5018 5.02 ***
Loss -0.0118 -8.69 *** -0.0075 -4.12 *** -0.0043 -1.84 *
Special -0.0297 -1.56  -0.0509 -2.31 ** 0.0212 0.71  
Coverage 0.0034 1.63  0.0003 0.15  0.0031 1.1  
MV 0.0003 0.50  -0.0006 -1.46  0.0009 1.33  
PB 0.0002 1.12  -0.0001 -0.66  0.0003 1.31  
VolRet -0.0085 -0.20  0.0767 1.59  -0.0852 -1.29  
DGD 0.0013 0.93  -0.0013 -1.18  0.0025 1.47  
DCFS 0.0036 0.94  0.0023 0.87  0.0014 0.3  
AbsUE*UE -58.9670 -19.60 *** -255.8887 -23.68 *** 196.9217 16.35 ***
Loss*UE -1.3624 -8.73 *** -3.8374 -7.75 *** 2.4750 4.45 ***
Special*UE -0.8653 -0.57  -3.7657 -1.02  2.9003 0.68  
Coverage*UE 0.0673 0.26  0.3486 0.42  -0.2813 -0.3  
MV*UE -0.2430 -4.03 *** -0.1947 -0.90  -0.0483 -0.2  
PB*UE 0.0161 0.67  0.7412 8.49 *** -0.7251 -7.45 ***
VolRet*UE -9.3975 -3.16 *** 26.3600 2.02 ** -35.7574 -2.48 **
DGD*UE 0.2348 1.22  0.4457 1.00  -0.2109 -0.41  
DCFS*UE 1.5242 2.62 *** 0.5973 0.25  0.9269 0.35  
QtrD4*UE -1.0324 -7.45 *** -1.9491 -4.73 *** 0.9168 1.97 **
N 25,451 25,759 
R2 0.0822 0.0802
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
SAnnFct is dummy variables of value one if the number of analyst forecasts at the 
time of earnings announcement (AnnFct) is greater than zero and less or equal to 
three, zero otherwise; LAnnFct is dummy variables of value one if AnnFct is greater 
than four, zero otherwise. Forecast dispersion is measured by standard deviation of 
analyst forecasts issued at the time of earnings announcements, deflated by quarter 
end stock price. Firms with dispersion value greater (less) than median value of 
dispersion in each year are assigned to high (low) dispersion firms. lnAnnFct is log 
of one plus the number of analysts’ announcement forecast. All models include year 
and quarter dummy variables. Please see table 1 for definition of other variables. 
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to previous test, we divide sample firms into two groups based on 
analyst forecast dispersion. Panel B reports the empirical results. 
We find stronger stock price reaction to earnings news (UE) for firms 
with low dispersion, but the difference is not statistically significant 
(-1.6030, t = -0.52). However, when more analysts issue forecasts 
with low dispersion (lnAnnFct*UE), we find significantly larger 
magnitude of stock reactions to earnings announcement (difference 
= -2.0154, t = -2.32). Our finding is consistent with finding by Imhoff 
and Lobo (1992) that uncertainty in analyst forecasts is negatively 
associated with the magnitude of ERCs. 
The results of higher stock price reaction to unexpected earnings 
are consistent with our results that analysts’ forecasts trigger 
more trading, which helps stock price incorporate new information 
more quickly. These results suggest that analysts’ forecasts help 
the dissemination of new information into market and analysts’ 
forecasts play the role of interpretation. 
4.5. Robustness Test
One concern of our results is that the number of analyst forecasts 
might be affected by firm disclosure quality which is positively 
correlated with analyst coverage (Bhushan 1989; Lang and 
Lundholm 1996). Because effects of earnings announcement and 
analyst forecasts are compounded for the firms with announcement 
forecasts, observed more sensitive stock price and trading volume 
response to unexpected earnings are attributable to analyst 
forecasts or other factors correlated with analyst announcement 
forecasts. Although our regression model includes analyst coverage 
to control for this potential effect, we further attempt to separate the 
effect of analyst forecasts from the effect of the earnings shock.
First, we use two-stage regression that mitigates the concerns 
of correlation between analyst coverage and the number of 
announcement forecasts. Specifically, we first estimate the expected 
number of announcement period forecasts, following earlier 
empirical work on the determinants of analyst forecast issuance 
at the time of earnings announcement (Stickel 1989; Zhang 2008). 
By using unexpected number of analyst forecasts at the time of 
earnings announcement, we exclude potential analysts’ forecasting 
behaviors that are correlated firm characteristics and analyst 
coverage. 
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In the first stage, we estimate the logarithm of one plus the 
number of announcement period forecasts as a linear function 
of absolute value of unexpected earnings (AbsUE), cumulative 
abnormal trading volume in prior quarter (CAbVol), firm size (MV), 
market-to-book ratio (PB), analyst coverage (Coverage), negative 
earnings (Loss), volatility of prior returns (VolRet), research and 
development expenditure (RD), extraordinary expenses (Special), 
average broker size measured by the average number of analyst 
employed by a brokerage firm (BrokerSize), average analyst 
experience measured by the average number of years since analysts 
cover the firm (Experience), and negative earnings (NegEN). We also 
include quarter dummy variables. We estimate unexpected number 
of announcement forecast (Resi_AnnFct) using the residuals from 
the first regression in each year. In the second stage, we examine 
the relation between unexpected announcement period forecasts 
and unexpected earnings, using equation (1) and (2). 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
, 1 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 1 6 ,
' ' ' ' '
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 ,
12
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j q j q j q j q j q j q j q
j q j q j q j q j q
AnnFct CAbVol AbsUE MV PB Coverage Loss
VolRet NegEN Special RD Experience
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ
λ
+ − += + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ ' , ,j q j qBrokerSize QuarterDummiesλ ε+ +∑
(3)
Table 5 reports the estimation results. Panel A reports the 
average value of coefficients on determinants of the number of 
analyst forecasts at the time of earnings announcements. We find 
significantly positive coefficients on prior quarter abnormal trading 
volume (CAbVolq-1), firm size (MV), market-to-book ratio (PB), return 
volatility (VolRet), and R&D expenditure (RD) and negative coefficient 
on special items in income statement (Special). We do not find 
significant coefficient on absolute value of unexpected earnings 
(AbsUE). In general, these results are consistent with prior empirical 
results from Stickel (1989) and Zhang (2008). The average value of 
R-square is about 0.64, which indicate that the explanatory power 
of the model is high.
Panel B reports the regression results of trading volume on 
analyst forecasts. The coefficient on Resi_lnAnnFct is significantly 
positive (0.0625, t = 7.51). In addition, the coefficient on interaction 
term of Resi_lnAnnFct *AbsRet is also significantly positive (0.0078, 
t=3.50). These results suggest that stock price changes accompanied 
with number of forecasts more than usual level is are more likely to 
increase trading volume. 
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In panel B, we report the regression of stock returns on 
unexpected earnings. Because the interaction between UE and Resi_
AnnFct will be positive when both variables are negative or positive, 
we separate unexpected earnings into two groups based on whether 
it is positive (PUE) or negative (NUE) for return regression. We use 
the absolute value for NUE so that the interaction between NUE and 
Resi_AnnFct is increasing with their value. We expect a negative 
relation between CAR and NUE as larger NUE will result in more 
negative stock price change. 
The coefficient on PUE is significantly positive (2.9341, p < 0.01) 
and the coefficient on NUE significantly negative (-3.0686, p < 0.01). 
The coefficient on PUE*Resi_AnnFct is significantly positive (0.6895, 
t = 6.56) and the coefficient on NUE*Resi_AnnFct negative (-0.5369, t 
= - 6.06), indicating that stock price is more sensitive to unexpected 
Table 5. Two-Stage Least Square Regression of abnormal trading volume 
around quarterly earnings announcements on unexpected number of 
announcement forecasts
Panel A. 1st stage regression results for the number of analyst forecasts at 
the time of earnings announcement
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
, 1 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 1 6 , 7 ,
' ' ' ' '
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j q j q j q j q j q
AnnFct CAbVol AbsUE MV PB Coverage Loss VolRet
NegEN Special RD Career Experience QuarterD
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ λ
+ − += + + + + + +
+ + + + + + ,j qummies ε+∑
Variable Mean t-value
Intercept -0.7167 -12.43 ***
C4AbVolq-1 1.0657 10.93 ***
AbsUE -0.4210 -0.84  
MV 0.0319 3.62 ***
PB 0.0066 4.23 ***
Coverage 0.7711 14.91 ***
VolRet 2.3677 3.51 ***
NegEN -0.0012 -0.13  
Special -0.0879 -3.48 ***
RD 0.0958 4.98 ***
Avg_Career 0.0121 1.29  
Avg_Broker 0.0152 2.00 *
QtrD2 0.0146 1.48  
QtrD3 0.0082 0.43  
QtrD4 0.0298 1.98 *
N 15
R2 0.6416
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earnings news and unexpected analyst forecasts. In general, two-
stage regression show that analyst forecasts more than normal level 
is more likely to affect sensitivity of trading volume and stock price 
reactions to earnings announcements.
We also attempt to separate the effect of analyst forecasts from 
earnings announcement by narrowing down event windows based on 
existence of analyst forecasts. More specifically, we first decompose 
the analyst announcement forecast subsample based on whether 
the analyst forecasts are made only on event day 0 or only event day 
1. We exclude sample observations that have analyst forecasts on 
both days 0 and 1. This reduces the total number of observations 
Table 5. (continued)
Panel B. 2nd stage regression results for cumulative abnormal trading 
volume on unexpected analysts’ announcement forecasts
' '
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QtrD AbsRet NYSE NASDAQ YearDummies QuarterDummies e
α α α α
α α α
+ × × + × + ×
+ × + + + +∑ ∑
Estimate t-value
Intercept 0.0052 4.27 ***
AbsRet 0.0030 9.11 ***
Resi_lnAnnFct 0.0656 7.48 ***
Resi_lnAnnFct*AbsRet 0.0092 3.89 ***
MV -0.0008 -5.94 ***
PB 0.0001 2.38 **
Coverage 0.0020 8.00 ***
VolRet -0.0865 -6.84 ***
DGD 0.0018 4.59 ***
DSCF -0.0033 -5.25 ***
MV*AbsRet 0.0105 11.30 ***
PB*AbsRet 0.0031 8.48 ***
Coverage*AbsRet 0.0337 18.38 ***
VolRet*AbsRet -1.8896 -30.35 ***
DGD*AbsRet -0.0033 -1.17  
DSCF*AbsRet 0.0510 7.32 ***
QtrD4*AbsRet 0.0351 12.97 ***
NYSE 0.0040 6.17 ***
NASDAQ 0.0075 11.81 ***
N 109,816
R2 0.2587
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Panel C. 2nd stage regression results for cumulative abnormal returns on 
unexpected analysts’ announcement forecasts
' ' ' ' '
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+ × + × + × ,   j qs QuarterDummies e+ +∑ ∑
Variables Expected Sign Estimate t-value
Intercept 0.0016 0.82  
Resi_lnAnnFct -0.0009 -1.53  
PUE 3.0807 11.47 ***
NUE -3.2340 -11.87 ***
Resi_lnAnnFct*PUE + 0.7233 6.34 ***
Resi_lnAnnFct*NUE - -0.5236 -5.50 ***
Loss -0.0119 -16.88 ***
Special -0.0358 -4.02 ***
Coverage -0.0003 -0.85  
MV -0.0005 -2.40 **
PB -0.0001 -0.66  
VolRet -0.0494 -2.36 **
DGD 0.0012 1.91 *
DCFS 0.0041 3.79 ***
AbsUE*UE -50.5453 -34.55 ***
Loss*UE -1.0493 -13.59 ***
Special*UE -1.3002 -2.12 **
Coverage*UE 0.6524 13.21 ***
MV*UE -0.0954 -3.70 ***
PB*UE 0.0444 3.21 ***
VolRet*UE -7.3124 -4.60 ***
DGD*UE 0.1082 1.12  
DCFS*UE 1.1774 5.32 ***
QtrD4*UE -0.5780 -8.13 ***
N 109,816
R2 0.057966
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Special is extraordinary items in income statement deflated by sales; RD is 
research and development expenses in income statement deflated by sales; 
Avg_Career is analysts’ average career measured as the log of average value of 
the number of quarters since the analysts first appear in I/B/E/S; and Avg_
Broker is average value of brokerage firm size measured as the log of average 
value of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage firms. If a firm 
does not report extraordinary item or R&D expenses, we treat them as zero. 
All models include year and quarter dummy variables. Please see table 1 for 
definition of variables.
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to 38,440 and 71,092 for firms with analyst forecasts on only day 
0 or day 1, respectively. We then divide the event window into 
two sub-periods, (-1, 0) and (1, 2). For those firms with forecasts 
issued only on day 1, and no forecasts on day 0, the stock price 
reaction during event window (-1, 0) is more likely to be affected by 
the earnings shock, UE or AbsRet, and less likely to be affected by 
analyst forecasts. On the other hand, stock price reaction during the 
(1, 2) window will be affected by both unexpected earnings and the 
analyst forecasts. If announcement period forecasts alter the return-
earnings relation, then the price reaction in the (1, 2) window will 
be related to the number of announcement forecasts and the price 
reaction in the (-1, 0) window will not. 
Table 6 presents the empirical results. Panel A shows regression 
results for the subsample with no announcement forecasts on 
day 0 but forecasts only on day 1. The first column reports the 
return reaction to AbsRet during the (-1, 0) window. We find a 
significantly positive coefficient on AbsRet, indicating that stock 
volume reaction is is strongly related to stock price change. We 
also find both coefficients on LAnnFct*AbsRet (0.0012, t = 0.28) and 
SAnnFct*AbsRet (0.0036, t = 1.38) are insignificant. 
The second column of panel A reports regression results for 
the (1, 2) window. In this window, trading volume is likely to be 
affected by two information sources: analyst forecasts and earnings 
announcements. The coefficient on AbsRet is still significantly 
positive, suggesting that stock returns during window (1, 2) are still 
affected by earnings news. The coefficient on SAnnFct*UE is 0.0194 (t 
= 6.53) and the coefficient on LAnnFct*UE is 0.0284 (t = 6.47). Both 
coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, and 
the coefficient on LannFct*AbsRet is significantly larger than the 
coefficient on SAnnFct*AbsRet (0.0132, p<0.01). 
Similarly, we repeat the test using subsample with announcement 
forecasts on only day 0 and no announcement period forecasts 
on day 1. Panel B reports the results. In general, we find positive 
relationship between the sensitivity of trading volume reactions to 
earnings announcement and the number of analyst forecasts in 
the period with analyst forecasts, we do not find this relation when 
there is no forecasts.5) We also repeat these tests with divided sub-
  5) During window (1, 2) we find negative coefficient on AbsRet (-0.0146, t = -1.44), 
suggesting that trading volume does not react to earnings news in this Window. 
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One possible interpretation of this result is that analysts’ forecasts make stock 
market incorporate new information fully in window (-1, 0) so that there is 
earnings news have little effect in window (1, 2).
Table 6. Trading volume response to stock price change and analyst 
forecasts during the event window (-1, 0) and (1, 2) around an earnings 
announcement
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Panel A. Firms with at least one announcement period forecast on event 
day 1and no announcement period forecast on event day 0.
Variables
Window (-1, 0) Window (1, 2)
Estimate t Value Estimate t Value
Intercept 0.0015 2.44 ** 0.0038 4.87 ***
SAnnFct 0.0002 0.99  0.0001 0.46  
LannFct 0.0020 6.61 *** 0.0043 10.81 ***
AbsRet 0.0715 9.38 *** 0.0167 1.82 *
SannFct*AbsRet 0.0036 1.38  0.0194 6.53 ***
LannFct*AbsRet 0.0012 0.28  0.0284 6.47 ***
MV 0.0001 1.71 * -0.0003 -3.36 ***
PB 0.0000 -0.58  0.0000 1.20  
Coverage -0.0009 -6.13 *** 0.0003 1.84 *
VolRet -0.0934 -16.44 *** -0.0577 -7.90 ***
DGD -0.0004 -1.67 * 0.0005 2.00 **
DSCF 0.0000 0.08  -0.0010 -2.76 ***
MV*AbsRet 0.0069 8.04 *** 0.0151 15.26 ***
PB*AbsRet 0.0014 4.36 *** 0.0024 6.83 ***
Coverage*AbsRet 0.0061 3.05 *** 0.0210 9.25 ***
VolRet*AbsRet -0.9840 -17.93 *** -1.3079 -21.19 ***
DGD*AbsRet -0.0061 -2.19 ** -0.0043 -1.42  
DSCF*AbsRet 0.0256 4.39 *** 0.0545 7.61 ***
QtrD4*AbsRet 0.0262 10.19 *** 0.0280 9.93 ***
NYSE 0.0008 2.41 ** 0.0018 4.37 ***
NASDAQ 0.0014 4.69 *** 0.0040 10.13 ***
N 71,092 71,092
Adjusted R-squre 0.1403 0.2831
F-Test
LAnnFct*AbsRet - 
SAnnFct*AbsRet -0.0006 0.03  0.0132 15.31 ***
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Table 6. (continued)
Panel B. Firms with at least one announcement period forecast on event 
day 0 and no announcement forecast on event day 1.
Variables
Window (-1, 0) Window (1, 2)
Estimate t Value Estimate t Value
Intercept 0.0049 6.33 *** 0.0082 9.89 ***
SAnnFct 0.0017 5.69 *** 0.0013 4.17 ***
LannFct 0.0037 4.14 *** 0.0011 1.12  
AbsRet 0.0587 6.43 *** -0.0146 -1.44  
SannFct*AbsRet 0.0154 4.07 *** -0.0356 -7.60 ***
LannFct*AbsRet 0.0638 5.44 *** -0.0044 -0.24  
MV -0.0002 -2.14 ** -0.0004 -4.60 ***
PB -0.0001 -1.89 * -0.0001 -1.46  
Coverage -0.0006 -3.29 *** -0.0002 -0.99  
VolRet -0.0959 -12.39 *** -0.0995 -11.84 ***
DGD -0.0005 -1.52  -0.0002 -0.67  
DSCF 0.0003 0.95  -0.0005 -1.42  
MV*AbsRet 0.0104 9.9 *** 0.0190 16.44 ***
PB*AbsRet 0.0016 3.51 *** 0.0017 3.59 ***
Coverage*AbsRet 0.0058 2.5 ** 0.0107 4.47 ***
VolRet*AbsRet -0.8844 -11.74 *** -0.8383 -10.33 ***
DGD*AbsRet -0.0035 -0.88  -0.0016 -0.37  
DSCF*AbsRet 0.0147 2.2 ** 0.0586 7.97 ***
QtrD4*AbsRet 0.0218 6.26 *** 0.0294 8.09 ***
NYSE 0.0008 2.01 ** 0.0013 3.27 ***





SAnnFct*AbsRet 0.0505 20.38 *** 0.0310 3.09 *
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
CAbVol is cumulative abnormal trading volume during two days of event 
window (-1, 0) or (1, 2). SAnnFct is dummy variables of value one if the number 
of analyst forecasts at the time of earnings announcement (AnnFct) is greater 
than zero and less or equal to three, zero otherwise; LAnnFct is dummy 
variables of value one if AnnFct is greater than four, zero otherwise. All models 
include year and quarter dummy variables. Please see table 1 for definition of 
other variables. 
Earnings Announcements, Analyst Forecasts, and Trading Volume 37
windows for stock-return reactions to unexpected earnings and find 
similar results (untabulated). 
In general, we find linear relationship between sensitivity of 
trading volume reaction to stock price and analyst forecasts when 
Table 7. Comparison of trading volume reaction to stock price change 
and analyst forecasts between high consensus and low consensus among 
analyst forecasts 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 1 , 5 , 1 , 6 ,
9 , 7 , 1 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , , 12 ,   + +
j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q
j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q
CAbVol SAnnFct LAnnFct AbsRet SAnnFct AbsRet LAnnFct AbsRet MV
PB Coverage VolRet DGD DCF MV AbsRet PB A
α α α α α α α
α α α α α α α
+ + + +
+
= + + + + × + × +
+ + + + + × × ,
13 , 1 , 14 , , 15 , , 16 , , 17 , ,
18 , , 19 , 20 ,
   +
   4 +
j q
j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q j q
j q j q j q j q
bsRet
Coverage AbsRet VolRet AbsRet VolRet AbsRet DGD AbsRet DCFS AbsRet
QtrD AbsRet NYSE NASDAQ YearDummies QuarterDummi
α α α α α
α α α
++ × + × × + × + ×
+ × + + +∑ ,j qes e+∑
Variables
High Consensus Low Consensus
Difference 
(High – Low)
Estimate t Value Estimate t Value Estimate t Value
Intercept -0.0088 -1.76 * 0.0013 0.17  -0.0101 0.29  
AbsRet 0.2226 8.08 *** 0.1029 2.01 ** 0.1197 0.05 **
lnAnnFct 0.0027 2.03 ** 0.0060 2.81 *** -0.0033 0.20  
lnAnnFct*AbsRet 0.0839 9.32 *** 0.0533 3.63 *** 0.0306 0.09 *
MV -0.0035 -10.57 *** -0.0030 -5.68 *** -0.0005 0.47  
PB 0.0005 4.51 *** 0.0001 0.50  0.0004 0.05 *
Coverage 0.0074 5.00 *** 0.0036 1.52  0.0038 0.19  
VolRet -0.0521 -1.67 * 0.0038 0.07  -0.0559 0.39  
DGD 0.0025 3.11 *** 0.0025 1.77 * -0.0001 0.97  
DSCF 0.0046 1.83 * -0.0026 -0.65  0.0072 0.14  
MV*AbsRet 0.0126 5.51 *** 0.0087 2.20 ** 0.0039 0.41  
PB*AbsRet 0.0021 2.84 *** 0.0037 2.87 *** -0.0016 0.30  
Coverage*AbsRet -0.0359 -3.54 *** -0.0019 -0.11  -0.0340 0.10 *
VolRet*AbsRet -2.4292 -17.06 *** -2.7324 -10.70 *** 0.3031 0.32  
DGD*AbsRet -0.0166 -2.98 *** -0.0026 -0.25  -0.0140 0.26  
DSCF*AbsRet -0.0858 -3.89 *** 0.0249 0.60  -0.1107 0.02 **
QtrD4*AbsRet 0.0278 4.43 *** 0.0483 4.37 *** -0.0205 0.12  
NYSE 0.0096 2.82 *** 0.0049 0.97  0.0046 0.46  
NASDAQ 0.0150 4.41 *** 0.0097 1.91 * 0.0052 0.41  
N 25,460 7,970
R2 0.2812 0.2685
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Consensus is measured by Barron, et al. (1998), using analysts’ announcement 
forecasts. Firms with consensus value greater (less) than 0.5 is assigned to 
high (low) consensus sub-sample. lnAnnFct is one plus the number of analysts’ 
announcement forecast. All models include year and quarter dummy variables. 
Please see table 1 for definition of other variables.
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there is an issuance of analyst forecasts. However, we do not find 
this relationship when there is no issuance of analyst forecasts. 
These results provide additional evidence that the observed increase 
in volume sensitivity to earnings announcements is attributable to 
analyst announcement period forecasts.
4.6. Additional Tests
We use alternative measure uncertainty in analysts’ forecasts, 
consensus measure developed by Barron et al. (1998). Barron et 
al. measure the consensus by the ratio of analyst dispersion to 
the mean of the squared error of individual analysts’ forecasts. 
Intuitively, their consensus measure captures the commonality of 
investors’ information, gauged by the correlation of their forecast 
errors around an assumed expected error of zero. Thus, high 
consensus in analyst forecasts means the less uncertainty among 
analysts regarding interpretations of earnings news. 
Using analyst forecasts issued at the time of earnings announce-
ment, we measure Barron et al.’s (1998) consensus measure. We use 
observations of which consensus measure values are between zero 
and one with a minimum of three analyst forecasts. We assign firms 
to high (low) consensus sample if consensus value is greater (less) 
than 0.5. Low consensus means there is more private information 
different from earnings signal among analyst forecasts. We examine 
whether trading volume reactions to stock price reactions and 
compare the magnitude of coefficients between two groups.
Table 7 reports the empirical results. We find that the magnitude 
of Intercept and coefficient on lnAnnFct is greater for firms with low 
consensus sample. These results suggest that on average, those 
firms with more private information from analysts (low consensus) 
tend to experience higher trading volume at the time of the earnings 
announcement. These results are consistent with prior evidence 
by Barron, Harris, and Stanford (2005). However, consistent with 
our previous test results, we find that sensitivity of trading volume 
to stock price changes is greater when there is high consensus 
in analyst forecasts. These results support that more intensity in 
analysts’ interpretations make investors trade based on earnings 
news.
Related to our study, Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2010) examine 
the analyst’s interpretation role by examining absolute value of 
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stock returns around earnings announcement as proxy for total 
information content of earnings announcement. They assume that 
magnitude of stock price change reflect the informativeness of 
earnings announcement. However, Chen et al. consider analysts’ 
forecasting activities around the earnings announcement, excluding 
analysts’ activities at the time of earnings announcement. We focus 
on the effect of analysts’ activities by narrowing down the event 
window to earnings announcements.
Following Chen et al. (2010), we examine how total magnitude of 
stock price change is affected by the number of analyst forecasts, 
using equation (2). As we examine the absolute value of stock price 
change as dependent variables, we also use the absolute value of 
unexpected earning to measure the total magnitude of unexpected 
earnings (AbsUE) instead of unexpected earnings (UE). We interact 
AbsUE with other control variables. Untabulated empirical results 
show that the sensitivity of absolute stock price reaction to earnings 
announcement is greater when more analysts issue forecasts at the 
time of earnings announcement. The degree to which the number of 
analysts’ announcement forecasts reflects the analysts’ information 
interpreting activities, our evidence provides more direct evidence 
on the analyst’s role of helping investors reflect the information 
contained in the earnings announcements. 
We also change the event window to three days (-1, 1). Previous 
studies commonly use three day window to examine market reaction 
to earnings announcement. In general, the results (untabulated) 
are consistent with previous our findings that return and volume 
reaction to earnings announcement is increasing with the number of 
analysts’ announcement period forecasts. These results suggest that 
one of determinants of ERC could be analysts’ forecasting activities 
during the earnings announcement.
5. ConClusion
This paper provides evidence on how the activities of informed 
traders affect the market reaction to earnings news by analyzing 
the relation between the number of announcement period analyst 
forecasts and the stock price and trading volume reactions to the 
earnings announcement. Although many studies demonstrate the 
effect of earnings announcement on stock prices (Lev 1989), there 
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is little research on the role informed traders play in disseminating 
information contained in earnings announcements. 
Our empirical results show that the trading volume and stock 
price reaction to new information from earnings announcement 
increases monotonically with the number of analyst forecasts 
issued at the time of earnings announcement. We also find that the 
sensitivity of volume reaction to stock price changes and analyst 
forecasts is smaller when there is large dispersion in analysts’ 
announcement forecasts. These results suggest that more active 
trading related to earnings announcements make stock price reflect 
earnings news more fully. In addition, analysts’ interpretations with 
low uncertainty help investors impound new information contained 
in earnings reports. 
Our study contributes to the extant literature by providing 
evidence on the role of interpretations. While many analytical 
studies suggest the potential effect of analysts’ activities at the 
time of earnings announcement on information content of earnings 
announcement (Kim and Verrecchia 1991b, 1994, 1997), there is 
little evidence on this issue. Our study suggests that differential 
market reactions to earnings announcements documented by prior 
research may be partly attributable to analyst announcement period 
forecasts.  Our study also suggest that analyst forecasts at the time 
of earnings announcement play the role of interpreting information 
and help investors incorporate new information from earnings 
announcement. 
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